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 Executive Summary 
 
In this article, Professor Schwarcz examines the role of rating “agencies” in ordering 
financial markets in the United States and abroad. Though rating agencies are largely 
unregulated private entities, they significantly influence the global economic system. Recent 
international proposals regarding the determination of capital adequacy guidelines for the 
banking industry call for an even greater role for rating agencies. In this light, Professor 
Schwarcz queries whether market forces provide sufficient restraint on rating agencies or 
whether public sector regulation is warranted. In the latter case, he also asks whether it is feasible 
for individual nations to regulate multinational entities of this type. 
  The article initially addresses the functions, origin and terminology of rating agencies. 
Through the development and nearly universal acceptance of ratings, investors are able to assess 
the risk attendant to investments in public and privately issued debt securities. The article then 
addresses the issue of regulation, focusing on the competing regulatory goals of efficiency and 
distributional interests. Concluding that any regulation of rating agencies should be largely 
rooted in efficiency concerns, Professor Schwarcz posits that regulation could increase efficiency 
by either bolstering rating agency performance or mitigating negative consequences of rating 
agency misbehavior.  
 
  Professor Schwarcz contends that regulation would not increase efficiency. Rating 
agency costs are not excessive, nor would increased regulation result in greater ratings reliability. 
Rating agencies are already motivated to provide accurate and efficient ratings because their 
profitability is directly tied to reputation. Conversely, additional regulation could possibly 
subject ratings to political manipulation, thereby impairing ratings reliability. 
 
  The article also rejects the contention that regulation would mitigate any negative 
consequences of rating agency misbehavior. Although the practice of requiring issuers to pay for 
a rating raises a potential conflict of interest, Professor Schwarcz argues that the risk of 
misbehavior is minimal and is largely deterred by the potential impact on reputation costs. He 
also argues that reputation can be a substitute for regulation, and that, at least for rating agencies, 
reputation drives much of the accountability that ordinarily is achieved through the democratic 
process. 
  
  Regulation of rating agencies is also unlikely to resolve their traditionally conservative 
bias against innovative new financial structures. Government regulation may in fact increase the 
bias by reducing competition among rating agencies. Moreover, given the international nature of 
rating agencies and the fact that their assets are human capital, regulation by individual nations 
could drive rating agencies to relocate to foreign nations that do not impose regulation. Professor 
Schwarcz concludes that public regulation of rating agencies is an unnecessary and potentially 
costly policy option.  
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